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Confining, Incapacitating, and
Partitioning the Body: Carcerality
and Surveillance in Samuel
Beckett’s Endgame, Happy Days, and 
Play
Victoria Swanson
1 Beckett’s works are often said to reflect the human condition. Certainly, such claims
are reinforced by his dramatic oeuvre, within which Beckett populates his theatrical
landscapes with whittled-down remnants of people such as ashcan dwelling amputees,
partitioned  heads,  or  a  disembodied  mouth.  The  development  of  such  isolated
consciousnesses, existing in a meaningless world that sets them at physical odds with
their surroundings, are inextricably linked to and influenced by the historical moment
in which Beckett writes. In both a historical and a philosophical sense, many of his
depictions  and  the  ways  in  which  he  presents  images  of  subjectivity  reflect  the
widespread disillusionment that followed in the wake of World War Two. Because he
writes  in  the  shadow of  The Holocaust,  Beckett  knows firsthand the  horrors  of  an
unchecked power structure. He was, by all accounts, an integral participant within the
most prolific intellectual and artistic circles in post-World-War-Two France—at a time
when philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser, and Claude Lévi-Strauss
were parsing issues of existentialism, Marxism, and structural anthropology.
2 Most  thinkers  in  France,  including  Beckett  recognized  the  war  as  a  socio-cultural
rupture.  Indeed,  no  one  operating  within  proximity  to  Europe  could  have  gone
untouched  by  its  violence  and  destruction.  Therefore,  it  is  not  surprising  that
similarities  can be traced between various schools  of  French thought and Beckett’s
works.  In  Beckett  and  Poststructuralism Anthony  Uhlmann  finds  that  there  are
“numerous  and  striking  points  of  intersection”  between  Beckett’s  works  and  the
concerns of French philosophers in post-World-War-Two France; as he puts it, “they
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discuss  the same problems because these were the social  and intellectual  problems
inherent in the world they encountered” (34). Uhlmann addresses what he refers to as
“the problem field” (35) through which, he suggests, Beckett and post-World-War-Two
French philosophers can be aligned as writers who:
[W]rite  in  response to  common problems […]  certain common antecedents,  and
thereby  develop  similar  themes,  similar  responses.  This,  then,  might  provide
explication  of  how  works,  apparently  unrelated and  belonging  to  different
disciplinary traditions, resonate with one another within a given milieu. (35)
3 In this article, while acknowledging points of philosophical intersections, particularly
between Sartre’s and Beckett’s treatments of subjectivity, I focus on the ways in which
Beckett’s partitioning of the subject and the dispersal of the self is mirrored in Michel
Foucault’s  work.  Beckett’s  preoccupation  with  confined  bodies  is  expressed  across
multiple dramatic texts. For example, being trapped, entombed, buried alive, crippled,
blinded,  or  held  captive  are  universally  terrifying  scenarios  which  the  characters
populating Endgame (1957), Happy Days (1961), and Play (1963) are forced to endure to
varying degrees. The carcerality imposed by or upon the characters in these plays is
central to Beckett’s development of the dramatic trajectory of repetition, confinement,
constraint, and immobility. This, I argue, demonstrates how Beckett’s drama utilizes
subjectivity in a way that both engages and resists Sartrean themes. The connections
between the methods used by Beckett  and Sartre are significant;  however,  it  is  my
contention  that  parsing  panoptic  constructions  with  Beckett’s  portrayals  of
subjectivity,  fragmentation,  and  debilitated  physicality  and/or  consciousness  in
Endgame, Happy Days, and Play demonstrates both the parallels and disparities within
the  constructs  of  carcerality  and  subjectivity  present  in  Beckett  and  Foucault’s
respective milieus and works.
4 Beckett’s work, given its historical context,  reflects the existentialist  thought of his
time; therefore, his plays and novels are often read through a Sartrean lens. That Sartre
defines the human gaze as a paralyzing, objectifying construct that denies subjectivity
and  freedom  captures  an  important  feature  of  Beckett’s  drama.  Sartre  sees  the
objectifying gaze of the “Other” as something that is always already internalized by the
subject. The organizing consciousness, the consciousness of the observer, displaces and
objectifies  the  subject.  Sartre  and Beckett  both present  the  gaze  of  the  “Other”  as
violent  and  subjectifying.  Sartre’s  Being  and  Nothingness:  A  Phenomenological  Essay  on
Ontology (1943) contemplates the visual  apprehension of  an Other by illustrating an
encounter:
I am in a public park. Not far away there is a lawn and along the edge of that lawn
there are benches. A man passes by those benches. I see this man; I apprehend him
as an object and at the same time as a man. What does this signify? What do I mean
that this object is a man? […] We are dealing with a relation which is without parts,
given at  one stroke,  inside  of  which there  unfolds  a  spatiality  which is not  my
spatiality;  for  instead  of  a  grouping  toward  me of  the  objects,  there  is  now  an
orientation which flees from me. (341-42)
5 Yet, this existential framework overlooks a significant part of Beckett’s work. Sartre
presents subjectivity as a dilemma, but he grants the subject the possibility of a kind of
existential heroism whereby the subject can achieve authenticity by willing his or her
own absurd existence. Diverging from Sartre’s existential model, Beckett’s drama does
not make possible the authentic act, will, or existential heroism—those movements of
authenticity  towards  which the Sartrean subject  aspires.  While  Beckett’s  works  are
understood  as  framed  by  a  Sartrean  milieu,  where  being  precedes  essence,  it  is
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reductive to read Beckett exclusively through a lens that insists upon reaching for the
meaning and tragedy of language’s failure. By contrasting Beckett’s methodologies to
those later developed by Michel Foucault, it may be argued that Beckett embraces the
impossibility  of  meaning  as  liberation  from  the  confinement  inherent  with
predicaments of subjectivity, power, and the limitations of language.
6 As Deleuze so aptly reminds us, Beckett “exhausts the possible” (Deleuze 7), and this is
indeed true of subjectivity for Beckett’s characters as his characterizations magnify the
dilemmas of Cartesian duality. Beckett often places each character’s consciousness in
stark contrast with the substantial self on which it reflects. In so doing, he presents
subjectivity as a predicament of self-consciousness. For Beckett, the Sartrean vision of
subjectivity is a trap that can only be escaped, if it can at all, by the kind of self-violence
that  leads  to  self-dissolution.  Sartre  sees  the subject-object  relation  in  terms  of
exteriority whereby one sees while also being seen and where only through being seen
does gazing actualize a relation which remains outside the self.  Indeed, there is  no
escape from the Sartrean gaze,  from the hell  of  other people1,  and for Beckett this
condition cannot be resolved except through dissolution of subjectivity itself. In this
way, Beckett both appropriates and resists Sartrean themes.
7 While  Beckett’s  subjects  are  bound  by  the  gazes  of  “Others”  and  struggle,
unsuccessfully,  to  escape  these  gazes,  what  makes  these  gazes  so  powerful  and
inescapable is the way in which they are internalized. Beckett’s works often present
subjects straddling the line between subjectivity and subjugation. In Beckett’s cosmos,
subjectivity is, in itself, subjugation as self-consciousness becomes its own worst enemy
through its  internalization of  power.  For  instance,  in Endgame ,  Clov  epitomizes  the
internalization of power as he allows himself to be both subjectified and subjugated by
Hamm.  Through  this  self-conscious  internalization  of  authority,  Beckett  employs
subjectivity and subjugation interchangeably, often simultaneously.
8 Such structures in Beckett’s dramatic works extend beyond the character-subject to
reflect larger social and historical implications. His emphasis on the internalization of
authority  stretches  beyond  the  dilemmas  offered  by  Sartre’s  interpretation  of
subjectivity and anticipates poststructuralist explorations of carcerality, entrapment,
confinement,  and  incapacity.  Beckett’s  focus  on  portraying  both  internalized  and
externalized  forms  of  subjectivity  diverges  from  Sartrean  examples.  Furthermore,
Beckett’s mingling of internalizations of authority with depictions of both corporeal
and  psychological  entrapment  demonstrates  how  his  vision  in  transforming  Sartre
anticipates the works of Michel Foucault. Where the Sartrean gaze objectifies, Foucault
insists that the gaze creates the subject. Michel Foucault, who attended the university
at  the  École  Normale  Supérieure  following the  war  (1946),  reacted to  the  post-war
intellectual  environment  through  his  own  forays  into  the  marginalization  of  the
subject.  For example, Foucault’s explorations in The Birth of  the Clinic (1963) and The
Order  of  Things (1966)  take  previous  accounts  of  subjectivity  to  task.  Like  Beckett,
Foucault also diverges from Sartre’s position that the subject is a centralized figure,
recognizing,  instead,  the  marginality  of  the  subject.  Foucault  locates  power  in
structures  of  observation  in  the  carceral  machinery  and  this  renders  the  subject
peripheral. For Foucault, power is internalized; it is within the system and the subject is
the peripheral effect of the system.
9 Both Beckett  and Foucault  see  a  world of  stasis  that  seems designed to  create  and
control human desire. Beckett’s imagery of confinement and claustrophobia finds its
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theoretical counterpart in Foucault’s theories of carcerality. Although the sources for
inspiration may differ between these two thinkers, it  is evident—through Foucault’s
quotations of Beckett in both the “The Order of Discourse” and “What is an Author?”—
that Beckett’s work resonates with Foucault. Further, there are similarities between the
methodologies  that  Beckett  and  Foucault  employ  in  their  conceptualizations  of
subjectivity. Both Beckett and Foucault recognize the constraints of subjectivity, most
palpably;  they  both  call  into  question  the  personal  and  public  functioning  of  the
subject, the ways in which order impacts meaning and the reliability of subjectivity.
Foucault  himself  acknowledges  that  Beckett’s  Waiting  for  Godot  (1952)  served  as  a
catalyst from which he developed a new critical perspective:
I  belong  to  that  generation  who,  as  students,  had  before  their  eyes,  and  were
limited by, a horizon consisting of Marxism, phenomenology, and existentialism.
Interesting  and  stimulating  as  these  might  be,  naturally  they  produced  in  the
students completely immersed in them a feeling of being stifled, and the urge to
look elsewhere. I was like all other students of philosophy at that time, and for me
the break was first Beckett’s Waiting for Godot. (Begam, 185)
10 Foucault’s  admission  indicates  that  Beckett  provided  the  impetus  which  led  to  the
“break” he sought from accepted praxis. Clearly, given Foucault’s statement and his
philosophical preoccupations, even a casual familiarity with Beckett’s work reveals the
importance  of  the  imagery  of  confinement  and surveillance  to  Foucault’s  thinking.
Beyond such fortuitous connections, both bodies of work present the stark account of
human subjectivity that emerges in post-war France which is, consequently, also the
subject of Sartrean existentialism. Within the dialectic of comparisons, it is reasonable
to assume that  the connections between Beckett  and Foucault  have not  been more
rigorously  explored  because  the  existentialist  noir  that  epitomizes  Beckettian
constructs  seems,  in  many  ways,  vastly  different  from  Foucault’s  highly  technical
language of structuralism. However, for Foucault, subjectivity, while not desirable, is
productive—serving  purposeful  functions  within  the  constructs  and  operations  of
Power. Alternately, Beckett’s work posits subjectivity as a failure of Power.
11 Beckett  does not  acknowledge the predictability  that  is  required for  subjectivity  to
succeed. Rather, he recognizes the potential for a chaotic function of the subject that,
once initiated, can disrupt the machinations of Power. Perhaps the chaotic potential of
the subject is demonstrated most effectively in Beckett’s short prose piece “The Lost
Ones” which portrays an “Abode where lost bodies roam […] Inside a flattened cylinder
fifty meters  round  and  sixteen  high  for  the  sake  of  harmony”  (101).  The  abode  is
described as being “Narrow enough for flight to be in vain” (101), and the “harmony”
mentioned in the opening of the piece is achieved by the subjects’ queuing up for their
turn at a climb up and then back down a system of ladders to convey the “searchers” or
subjects  into  and  then  back  out  of  a  series  of  niches  and  tunnels.  Should  an
“unprincipled climber […] engross the ladder beyond what is reasonable [or] fancy to
settle down permanently in one of the niches or tunnels [he would leave] behind him a
ladder out of service for good and all” (208). Beckett’s narrator concedes that
This  is  indeed  strange.  But  what  is  at  stake  is  the  fundamental  principle  of
forbidding ascent more than one at a time the repeated violation of which would
soon transform the abode into a pandemonium (209).
12 This example suggests that the power structure would be disrupted if the subjects in
question attempt to challenge the fundamental principle that governs rules of motion
as such violations would lead to  “pandemonium.” For Beckett,  subjectivity  produces
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nothing and the “harmony” that Power hopes to achieve through subjectivity remains
vulnerable to disruption, to the potentially chaotic function of the subject.
13 Beckett’s use of carceral formations in his dramatic works confines and constricts both
his theatrical subjects and his actors2. In this way, Beckett demonstrates the kinds of
containment, surveillance, and futility that Michel Foucault describes in Discipline and
Punish:  The  Birth  of  the  Prison.  Foucault  illustrates  the  reach  of  carcerality  by  first
offering  Bentham’s  Panopticon  as  an  example  of  central  Power  and  peripheral
subjectivity:
An inspector arriving unexpectedly at the center of the Panopticon will be able to
judge  at  a  glance,  without  anything  being  concealed  from him,  how the  entire
establishment is functioning (204).
14 However, Foucault then expands Bentham’s model, suggesting that its utility extends
beyond the prison, becoming an institutional mechanism that exacts its subjective gaze
across society as a whole: “The Panopticon, on the other hand, must be understood as a
generalized model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the
everyday  life  of  men”  (205).  Foucault  points  to  the  complicit  subject  as  a  central
construct of panopticism, whereby cooperation with the power structure becomes so
ingrained and automatic that the subject requires little, if any, supervision. “The Lost
Ones”  illustrates  this  dichotomy  as  it  is  populated  by  a  veritable  swarm  of
enthusiastically  self-policing  subjects.  For  both  Beckett  and  Foucault,  the  ultimate
redemption lies  in the undoing of  the subject.  Beckett’s  plays are full  of  images of
physical confinement, but they anticipate Foucault in the most “dramatic” fashion in
the way they illustrate the internalization of authority.
15 Michel Foucault’s theories on carcerality, while echoing Beckett’s use of confinement,
also  provide  a  framework  through  which  to  explore  formations  of  surveillance,
restriction,  and carcerality  in Beckett’s  dramatic  works.  Foucault’s  reference to the
model  of  Bentham’s  Panopticon  amplifies  the  wider  implications  of  Beckett’s
theatricized variations  of  confining structures  as  Foucault’s  illustration of  panoptic
surveillance presents an institutionalization of the Sartrean gaze. Foucault finds that
Bentham’s model of Panoptic surveillance promotes interiority and ensures the inverse
of Sartre’s model in that seeing has no relation to being seen:
Bentham’s Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition [of Power]. We
know the principle on which it was based: at the periphery, an annular building; at
the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the
inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which
extends the whole width of the building […] all that is needed, then, is to place a
supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a
condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy [.…] The Panopticon is a machine for
dislocating the [Sartrean] see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally
seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever
being seen. (200-202).
16 While Sartre’s concept of the gaze and Foucault’s rendition of panoptic surveillance
diverge,  they  nonetheless  resonate  when  juxtaposed  with  Beckett’s  writings.  The
immuration that  frames much of  Beckett’s  theatrical  works  foreshadows Foucault’s
insights  on carcerality.  Beckett’s  Endgame,  Happy  Days,  and Play  all  offer  characters
circumscribed to either restrained movement or total confinement. Within these works
Beckett uses paralysis and confinement as governing, subjectifying, and centralizing
mechanisms.  For  example,  Beckett’s  application of  paralysis  ensures  his  characters’
vulnerability to observation; his people are often so restrained, so literally bound by
Confining, Incapacitating, and Partitioning the Body: Carcerality and Surveil...
Miranda, 4 | 2011
5
authority, and so self-regulating that they might best be described as deriving their
subjectivity from subjection. They are consistently undone by their own self-conscious
obsessions. The effects of these obsessions are evident in both the character’s dialogues
and  their  physical  confinement.  Their  limited  physicality  and  consciousness  marks
them as fragments of beings rather than fully formed “people.” Although these subjects
are presented in varying degrees of fragmentation—figures buried up to their necks in
earth  or  urns,  disembodied  lips,  the  elderly  convalescing  in  ash  cans—Beckett
ceaselessly offers clues within the narratives which suggest that these remnant figures
retain  their  corporeal  origins.  In  so  doing,  Beckett  depicts  these  individuals  as
corporeally vulnerable; however, there are few revelations within the narratives that
illuminate what these subjects may or may not think about their own vulnerability.
17 Whereas  Foucault  finds  that  panopticism  inevitably  extends  its  reach  beyond  the
prison until  it  is  woven so tightly  within the social  matrix  that  liberation from its
institutional  gaze  becomes  an  impossibility,  Beckett  demonstrates  the  aftermath of
such constriction—the remnant fragments of self and being, the trace that exists as the
only evidence of a potential whole from which the self must remain severed. In Samuel
Beckett and the Philosophical Image, Uhlmann asserts:
It  is  not  by  simple  chance  that  Michel  Foucault  turns  to  the  works  of  Samuel
Beckett in order to illustrate his ideas [….] Foucault was not alone in developing a
set  of  ideas  related to  these  questions  of  the  subject  in  France at  this  time [In
Beckett’s work] the critical eye focuses so fiercely on the self that the self disperses
and  flees,  yet  rather  than  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  self  to  the  work
vanishing it becomes diabolically complex. (108-09)
18 Foucault’s  work,  while  providing  insights  into  Beckett’s  manipulations  of  confined
bodies and consciousnesses also illustrates the Beckettian challenge to Sartre’s model
of existentialism. For Foucault, desire is never pure or purely accessible. This is also
true of Beckett, for whom desire may be expunged altogether as the natural world is
forever at  odds with the emptiness  and failings of  human consciousness.  Certainly,
Beckett demonstrates congruence with Sartre’s model of the gaze which paralyzes and
objectifies. However, Beckett diverges from this dyad, experimenting with mechanisms
that Foucault would later identify as carceral, where violence—even the violence of the
subjectifying gaze—is visited upon the body as an object and surveillance governs the
body  as  subject.  Foucault  sees  the  objectifying  gaze  as  being  internalized.  This
internalization is productive and economical as it keeps the subject working. Beckett
utilizes internalization as a duality between objectification and self-presentation. This
is particularly evident in Endgame wherein Clov, who is mobile and could leave, and, in
fact, threatens to leave, never does. Instead, he submits himself to do Hamm’s bidding.
Whereas Clov is the worker within the cosmos of Endgame, and Hamm sets himself up as
warder, even though he is blind and crippled, he has no real control over Clov. Clov
epitomizes Foucault’s  panoptic subject because he polices himself;  he self-regulates.
While  Foucault  embraces subjectivity  as  necessary for  the successful  functioning of
Power, Beckett presents subjectivity as a site of vulnerability which marks a failure of
Power.  Foucault  sees  subjectivity  as  not only  productive  but  also  necessary  for
production. For Beckett the inverse is true: subjectivity produces nothing.
19 Beckett’s  use  of  incapacitation  underscores  the  play’s  theme  of  repetitious  misery
wherein  the  characters  remain  utterly  stuck.  Beckett  makes  no  attempt  to  extract
dignity,  love,  or  even  a  small  amount  of  comfort  from  the  stark  nothingness  of
Endgame’s bleak stage or characters; rather, he allows their handicaps to keep them
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physically and emotionally confined—sentenced to remain partitioned from the world,
and in the case of Nell and Nagg, their ash can compartmentalization partitions them
from  one  another.  The  desolation  revealed  in  the  repetitiousness  of  the  perpetual
immobilizing forces, which are either thrust upon or adopted by the characters, frames
Endgame  and  mirrors  the  institutional  carcerality  of  the  prison  where  restrained
movement  and  total  confinement  are  coupled  with  constant  surveillance.  Beckett’s
version of carcerality in Endgame holds with panoptic discipline and clearly depicts a
carceral system wherein no one is really in charge. All of the surveillance in Endgame is
self-regulated by the characters, which is ironic, considering that throughout the play
the  antagonistic  self-instilled  warder  is  a  blind  man who  manages  to  “watch”  and
regulate everyone and everything around him.
20 Throughout the play, physical disability, such as Hamm’s literal paralysis, is juxtaposed
against Clov’s seemingly self-imposed position of paralyzing servitude—and in Clov’s
case, a combination of outside (Hamm’s) surveillance and inside or self-surveillance. Not
unlike the prison, levels of confinement and surveillance vary within Endgame. Hamm’s
wheelchair  projects  the  potential  for  at  least  some  movement,  Clov’s  limp  merely
restricts but does not necessarily confine him, and the compartmentalizing of Nell and
Nagg into ash cans bears a striking similarity to the prison and most specifically to the
utter enclosure of solitary confinement. Levels of confinement and surveillance vary
within Endgame. Foucault reveals that in moving beyond punishment to the system of
discipline which remains evident today:
The body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to
imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty
that  is  regarded  both  as  a  right  and  as  property.  The  body,  according  to  this
penalty,  is  caught up in a system of  constraints  and privations,  obligations and
prohibition. (Foucault 1975, II).
21 Endgame certainly depicts bodies that fall within Foucault’s definition of “instrument or
intermediary.” For example, Clov, the only mobile character in the play, completes a
constant  itinerary  of  instrumental  tasks.  Clov  is  obligated  by  the  incapacity  of  the
others to wait upon them. Most often, Clov simply does as he is told,  his servitude
prohibiting  him  from  autonomous  action.  Beckett’s  use  of  this  form  of  disciplined
servitude, whereby his characters simply do as they are expected without question or
thought  to  do  otherwise,  is  not  far  removed  from  the  ideas  of  self-regulating
instrumentation of the subject espoused in Foucault’s chapter on “The means of correct
training” wherein he writes:
Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards
individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise […] the success of
disciplinary power derives no doubt from the use of simple instruments [.…]. (170).
22 Foucault describes “hierarchical observation” (170) which when utilized can suppress a
group. While Clov is an individual subject, he consistently yields to the hierarchical
observations of Hamm. In Aesthetic Nervousness: Disability and the Crisis of Representation,
Ato Quayson remarks  that  impairment  and disability  in  Beckett’s  works  “[…]  bring
together an array of different images of corporeality [….]” (57). While the characters in
Endgame remain partitioned from one another and whatever  may or  may not  exist
beyond  their  shelter,  their  collective  non-movement  presents  containment  as
conditional to as much as a condition of their social system. The characters do lament
their  respective  isolation—Nagg and Nell,  for  example,  strain towards  one another,
hoping to kiss, but their physical distance prevents them from reaching one another
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(14). However, Hamm, at least, appears suspicious of what or who might exist beyond
the confines of their shelter’s walls: “[…] Old wall! Beyond is the … other hell. Closer!
Closer! Up Against!” (25-26). This scene mirrors Garcin’s realization in Sartre’s No Exit
that “Hell is—other people!” (61). Hamm’s reference to the “other” hell implies that he
too equates hell  with “Others”.  He also functions as  a  panoptic  device as  he is  the
absolute center and all else occurs at a peripheral distance to him. He imposes himself
as the central figure by insisting that Clov, who is the only character who can move
independently, place him in the physical center, literally center-stage:
Hamm: Am I right in the centre?
Clov: I’ll measure it.
Hamm: More or less! More or less! […]
Am I more or less in the centre?
Clov: I’d say so.
Hamm: You’d say so! Put me right in the center! (26-27)
23 Once satisfied that he is physically positioned in the center, the blind Hamm proceeds
to assert a vantage point, but as he cannot see, he can only do so through Clov’s gaze.
Hamm demands that Clov “Look at the earth” (27). Hamm’s centrality coupled with the
employment  of  his  superficial  gaze  imposes  a  Panoptic,  prison-like  system  of
surveillance upon the “Other” characters. Although Hamm’s gaze is not a sighted one,
he holds such hierarchy over Clov that he can use Clov’s sight as an extension that
replaces his own eyes.  Such an extension of sight and power exemplifies Foucault’s
assertions that “the Panopticon presents a cruel, ingenious, cage” (205), and illustrates
how the system of carcerality in Endgame presents a decidedly panoptic mechanism.
24 With Hamm at  its  center,  directing the continuum of  non-movement,  the stage on
which the play is performed becomes the inside or center into which the audience, the
outside, concentrates its collective gaze. Like the containment prevalent in the prison,
Beckett confines the characters to the socially and psychologically restrictive setting of
their shelter. The litmus test for the Panopticon’s effectiveness is its ability to cage and
condition the mind into a state of self-regulation; in this way, the “cruel, ingenious
cage” controls its subjects. The “control” in Endgame is presented as a mental cage, and
the physical  constraints  endured by the characters  ensure that  they remain bound
within that cage. By inhibiting spatial movement, Beckett frames his characters in such
a way that all of their social and physical confines are compartmentally observed by
the panoptic gaze of the audience, whose view can only be hindered by props such as
Nell  and Nagg’s ash cans,  Hamm’s handkerchief,  and Clov’s retreats to his off-stage
kitchen. Physical sight for the characters is either non-existent or restricted. Hamm is
blind,  Nell  and  Nagg—whose  ash  cans  are  set  side-by-side—can  “hardly”  see  one
another, and Clov’s vision is poor. Only through the use of a prop—a “telescope”—can
Clov turn his gaze onto the audience:
Clov: Things are livening up. (He gets up on ladder, raises the telescope, lets it fall.)
I did it on purpose. (He gets down, picks up the
telescope, turns it on the auditorium.) I see… a multitude… in
transports… of joy. That’s what I call a magnifier.
(He lowers the telescope, turns it towards Hamm). (29)
25 That Clov can only impose his gaze through the telescope denies him the capacity to
see peripherally and implies that while he can extend his gaze, his agency in doing so
must be asserted by means of an artificial substitution. This supplementation is not lost
on Ato Quayson who observes:
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Hamm’s insistence on knowing what lies outside their desolate room is satisfied by
Clov’s  spying out the landscape with the telescope,  another prosthesis  of  vision
that, significantly, also renders Clov himself dependent to a degree upon a notion of
bodily extension. (67).
26 Clov’s incapacities are more ambiguous than the ailments of the others. He can walk,
although  it  is  with  a  stiff  limp  and  while  he  is  the  only  character  who  is  able  to
independently move about, he is physically unable to sit. From the very opening lines
of Endgame, Clov communicates that he longs for an end: “Finished, it’s finished, nearly
finished, it must be nearly finished […] I can’t be punished any more […]” (1). That Clov
defines  himself  as  “being  punished”  signifies  that  he  senses  his  own  confinement.
Beckett depicts Clov as irrevocably stuck in a self-perpetuating cycle of carcerality; one
in which the characters’ compliance with their own subjectivity manifests as a mental
bind,  as  evidenced through their  self-regulation,  rather  than a  punitive  one.  While
physically able to leave, he remains trapped because he fears leaving and therefore
ensures that his condemnation to the punishment he so grievously laments is never
“finished.”
27 Foucault’s  explanation that  punishment and correction “are  processes  that  effect  a
transformation of the individual as a whole—of his body and of his habits by the daily
work that he is forced to perform, of his mind and of his will [.…] The prison […] will at
the same time be a machine for altering minds” (Foucault 1975, 125) illuminates Clov’s
self-regulating state of confinement. Clov, not unlike a machine, is constantly at task.
Beckett presents Clov’s mind and will as cycling, almost mechanically, through a litany
of tasks which seem habitual. Just as the functions of a machine must be regulated by
some  outside  operator,  Clov’s  movements  are  regulated  by  Hamm’s  manipulations.
Effectually, Clov’s “punished” state signifies as a machine-like process that is partly
supervised by Hamm and partly self-regulated. Thereby, Beckett situates Clov as the
embodiment of a machine which allows for a comic portrayal of Clov’s pseudo-tragic
confinement.
28 Beckett portrays the characters in Endgame as suffering, and in doing so, he initiates a
sociological commentary on the social dysfunction of passive compliance because in
Endgame the characters are aware that they suffer, but they do not aspire to improve
their suffering;  rather,  they seem resolved,  as demonstrated by Clov,  to improve at
suffering “I say to myself—sometimes, Clov you must learn to suffer better than that if
you want them to weary of punishing you—one day” (80). Why Nell and Nagg dwell in
garbage cans is never addressed, but the fact that they are stored as one would store
refuse is more than just a device Beckett employs to visually assail Endgame’s audience.
Beckett’s  use  of  debilitated  or  incapacitated  characters  ensures  their  further
surveillance. Even though Hamm cannot see, he cannot avoid being looked at. While he
externalizes his version of a gaze through Clov, he is simultaneously subjected to the
formalizing gaze of the spectator, including Clov. Hamm’s blindness binds him as he
cannot gaze back, sealing him within a static framework of immobility. Likewise, the
compartmentalization of Nell  and Nagg corresponds to the isolating confinement of
prison cells. The similarities between the panoptic prison and the Endgame stage are
evident  if  we recall  Foucault’s  description of  the panoptical  cells,  designed to  hold
within them “a madman [Hamm], a patient [Nell], a condemned man [Nagg], a worker
[Clov]” (Foucault 1975, 200). Beckett’s portrayal of these confined individuals mirrors
the  historio-sociological  approach  to  the  prison  wherein  Foucault  reminds  “the
discipline-blockade, the enclosed institution, established in the edges of society, turned
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inward toward negative functions: arresting evil […] At first,  they were expected to
neutralize  dangers,  to  fix  useless  or  disturbed  populations  […]”  (Foucault  209-10).
Regardless  of  Beckett’s  intent  for  the characters,  the partitioning of  Nell  and Nagg
serves,  at  the very least,  as  a  microscope through which the audience can glimpse
society’s treatment of the old, disabled, and infirm.
29 Rather than expand his characterizations in Endgame, Beckett whittles them down to
their  essence  and  invites  the  audience  to  imagine  the  scarcity  of  contact  and
incapacitation that his characters endure. Hamm complains: “That’s right. Me to play
[…] You weep, and weep, for nothing, so as not to laugh, and little by little […] you
begin  to  grieve  [….]”  (68).  Even  the  punishments  endured  by  the  characters  are
depicted as “natural” or, at the very least, second nature to them. He portrays Hamm as
the “technical” overseer, endowing him with the ‘technical’  ability to discipline the
others, particularly as Hamm has the combination to the larder, which gives him the
ability to ration out or withhold food. In “Trying to Understand Endgame,” Theodor W.
Adorno defines Endgame’s “abstract domination” as reflective of concentration camps—
the dark side of human nature, “the domination of nature which destroys itself” (145).
Here, again, “nature” is placed in terms of carcerality where either dominating nature
or being dominated by nature paradoxically produces the same result: the destruction
of nature. If this is the case, then it is arguable that Hamm’s central dominant position,
his “nature,” forms the catalyst which dismantles his and, consequently, the “Other”
characters’ world. Adorno states
Endgame occupies the nadir of what philosophy’s construction of the subject-object
confiscated  at  its  zenith:  pure  identity  becomes  the  identity  of  annihilation,
identity of subject and object in the state of complete alienation (128).
30 The character Nell, whose life is reduced to peeking her head out of the top of the ash
can she lives in, is the virtual embodiment of “the identity of alienation,” but she jests
at  her  predicament,  stating  “Nothing  is  funnier  than  unhappiness  [.…]”  (18).  Her
comment  contrasts  humor  against  the  dismal  setting  in  which  she  lives.  Adorno
postulates that Beckett’s Endgame exists as “an expression of meaning’s absence” (126).
A  sense  of  hopelessness  within  what  Adorno  calls  its  “organized  meaninglessness”
prevails in Endgame; as he states, “the prison of individuation is revealed as a prison
and  simultaneously  as  mere  semblance”  (127).  The  characters  in  Endgame,  while
partitioned from the world that may or may not exist just beyond the views of the
earth and the ocean that at least Clov can take in, remain in every way stuck. They are
bound to their  place on the stage,  constrained by debility,  and confined to mutual
subjugation.
31 Beckett  continues  to  experiment  with  precepts  of  surveillance,  incapacity  and
confinement in later plays. Perhaps the ash cans that contain Nell and Nagg in Endgame
inspired the confining mound of earth in Happy Days. Throughout the play, Beckett’s
protagonist Winnie remains implanted within the inescapable mound. The play opens
with Winnie, asleep, hunched over the ground, buried to her waist within a mound of
earth. A bell rings, according to the stage directions, “piercingly, say ten seconds, stops.
She does not move. Pause. Bell more piercingly, say five seconds. She wakes. Bell stops” (275).
The piercing quality  of  the bell  as  described in Beckett’s  stage directions gives the
impression that the sound should mimic an institutional or industrial ring not unlike
the bell  ringing in  a  school  that  directs  students  to  move through its  hallways,  or
perhaps a factory buzzer that rings at the beginning and ending of a work shift, or the
clamoring bell that rings in a prison whenever a security or cell door opens. Like the
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characters  in  Endgame, Winnie  also  suffers  from  a  physical  malady.  She  starts  off
examining herself, inspecting the skin of her arms: “Ah well, no worse. No better, no
worse, no change. No pain. Perhaps a shade off colour just the same” (278) and then
rummages through her shopping variety bag to retrieve a revolver—which she kisses.
Next, she pulls a near-empty bottle of medicine from her bag, pulls the bottle to her
lips and swigs back the last  drop.  Satisfied that she has used the last  drop of  pain
reliever, she pitches the empty bottle over her shoulder. It lands at a distance behind
her, and as Winnie cannot turn in that direction, any relief of her pain is cast away—
literally behind her (278). Winnie’s partner Willie is, like Clov, able to move about, but
not  without  physical  limitation.  Beckett  restricts  Willie’s  movements  to  crawling
between his hole and Winnie’s mound. Unlike Clov, however, Willie does very little to
aid  his  counterpart  and barely  speaks.  Still,  Winnie  frets  over  what  her  life  would
become without Willie: “If you were to die […] or go away and leave me, then what
would I do, what could I do, all day long, I mean between the bell for waking and the bell
for  sleep?”  (282).  From  Winnie’s  confined  position,  she can  lead  only  a  simplified
existence:  sleeping,  waking,  rummaging  through  her  bag,  cataloguing  her  things,
brushing her hair and teeth and talking to Willie. She wonders, “Perhaps some day the
earth will yield and let me go, the pull is so great, yes, crack all around me and let me
out” (289). However, the second act opens with “Winnie imbedded up to neck…. Her head,
which she can no longer turn, nor bow, nor raise, faces motionless throughout the act” (299).
Again Winnie is summoned by the bell, but this time she expresses her resentment of
the clamor and with her pain reliever gone, she laments her pain:
The bell. [Pause.] It hurts like a knife. [Pause.] A gouge. [Pause.] One cannot ignore it.
[Pause.] How often…[pause]…I say how often I have said, Ignore it, Winnie, ignore
the bell, pay no heed, just sleep and wake, sleep and wake, as you please, open and
close the eyes, as you please…. (302).
32 The bell holds sway over Winnie’s waking and sleeping. While the bell lacks a panoptic
“eye,”  it  nevertheless  functions  as  an  apparatus  of  surveillance  in  that  its  ringing
dictates the terms by which Winnie conducts her daily routine.
33 Winnie, who is in every way a prisoner, remains powerless to exact her freedom at the
close of the play. Her imprisoned state is reminiscent of the solitary confinement of
early prisons, which, ironically, inmates referred to as being sent to the hole. In “What
Can a Foucauldian Analysis Contribute to Disability Theory?” Bill Hughes remarks, “The
central contradiction of the human body is this: it is simultaneously a potential source
of our enslavement and of  our freedom” (89),  and while Hughes may be correct in
asserting that “Foucault would not see the body in these dialectical terms” (89), I would
argue that Beckett certainly does. Hughes insists that “For Foucault, the body does not
act in and on the world; rather, the body is docile” (86), and while Winnie’s passivity
and  resignation  to  her  plight  exemplifies  docile  compliance,  Beckett  weaves  hints
within her dialogue which suggest a bodily potential:
I  used to  perspire  freely.  [Pause.]  Now hardly  at  all.  [Pause.]  The heat  is  much
greater.  [Pause.]  The  perspiration  much  less.  [Pause.]  That  is  what  I  find  so
wonderful. [Pause.] The way man adapts himself. [Pause.] To changing conditions.
(290)
34 That Winnie recognizes her body’s adaptation to her physical confinement suggests
that  Beckett  does  indeed  see  the  human  body  as  a  potential  source  of  either
enslavement or of freedom. For Winnie, while her body continues to function, she will
inevitably remain entrapped, enslaved to linger in her half-life within the mound, but
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her  body’s  adaptation  to  her  entrapment,  the  eventual  failure  of  her  body,  and
ultimately the death of her body will facilitate her escape. For Winnie, the only way to
freedom remains, quite literally, through her body.
35 As the bell for waking rings at the start of Act II, Winnie’s response at waking changes
significantly from that in Act I, wherein she quips, “Another heavenly day” (275), to Act
II’s almost prayerful, “Hail, holy light. Someone is looking at me still. Caring for me
still” (300).  While  “Hail,  holy  light” mirrors  the opening lines  to  the third book of
Milton’s  “Paradise  Lost,3” here,  Winnie’s  narration  takes  on  clear  subject/object
overtones. That she is hailing the light and referring to it as holy suggests that she now
holds what she earlier called “Hellish light” (277) in some sort of reverence. Winnie’s
sense that “Someone is  looking at  me still” implies that she is  mindful  of  her own
subjectivity. She considers herself an object of holy surveillance. That is not to say that
Winnie  thinks  of  that  which  observes  her  as  having  a  divine  origin,  only  that  she
recognizes herself at wholly surveilled—observed in every sense. Taking Beckett’s sense
of humor into account, the line “Someone is looking at me still” also serves as a double-
entendre, suggesting that at the start of the second act, the audience—a veritable group
of someone’s, is still looking at Winnie. Beckett thus portrays Winnie as struggling with
her own crisis of identity: “To have always been what I am—and so changed from what I
was.  [Pause.]  I  am the one,  I  say the one,  then the other [....]  My arms.  [Pause.]  My
breasts.  [Pause.]  What  arms?  [Pause.]  What  breasts?” (300).  Winnie  expresses  her
frustration at her resounding physical lack by itemizing what remains:
The face. [Pause.] The nose. I can see it… [squinting down]… the tip… the nostrils…
breath of life… that curve you so admired [Pause.] a hint of lip… if I pout them out…
[sticks  out  tongue]  … the tongue of  course… you so admired… if  I  stick  it  out  …
suspicion of a brow… eyebrow… imagination possibly… [eyes left] … cheek… no.…
That is all. (301)
36 The more Winnie suffers the confinement of her physical body, the more emphasis she
places on what remains free. Winnie never loses sight of what she has retained: “I have
not lost my reason,” Winnie insists,  adding, “Not yet.  [Pause.]  Not all.  [Pause.]  Some
remains” (302).
37 Toward  the  end  of  the  second  act,  Winnie’s  entrapment  leaves  her  unable  to  do
anything but speak. However, this presents a conflict for Winnie. She announces, “I can
do no more. [Pause.] Say no more. [Pause.] But I must say more. [Pause.] Problem here”
(305). The narrative illustrates a paradox that is problematic for Winnie: she has no
more to say, yet she must say more. Winnie’s assertion that she must say more implies
that she feels compelled or coerced to speak her speech—a condition which must be
categorized as forced speech. By her own admission, she cannot speak; she has no more
to say. Yet, by virtue of her confinement and the constant gaze of the holy light under
which  she  is  wholly  surveilled,  Winnie  must  speak.  Foucault’s  illustration  of  the
Panopticon offers a frame of reference from which to consider Winnie’s compulsion to
speak.  She  enthusiastically  polices  herself  to  comply,  despite  her  confinement.  Of
course,  she  has  little  other  option:  Beckett  offers  her  no  other  alternative  for
expression beyond discourse. As the second act winds to a close, Winnie asks, “Does
anything remain? [Pause.] Any remains? [Pause.] No?” (306). Beckett leaves Winnie to
endure  a  state  of  gridlocked  stasis  that  will,  inevitably,  swallow  her  up.  Despite
Winnie’s attempts to adapt to her confinement, she has no real control. As her physical
body slips deeper within its earthen cell, Winnie is caught in a state of unattainable
longing, signifying Beckett’s position that these indignities can only be understood in
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light of subjectivity’s impossible yearnings. Throughout Happy Days we are continually
reminded that the need for wholeness and reconciliation may be as pernicious as the
lack of them. This is particularly evident in Winnie’s closing words. Unable to choose
between oblivion and a desire for reparation, she quips, “pray your old prayer, Winnie”
(297).
38 The figures in Play, which are far more otherworldly than the characters in Endgame 
and  Happy  Days,  suffer  a  level  of  incapacity  and  captivity  which  mirrors  Winnie’s
entrapment  by  virtue  of  the  urns  in  which  they  are  implanted.  Beckett’s  stage
directions instruct that the urns be placed quite specifically:
Front centre, touching one another, three identical grey urns of about one yard
high. From
each a head protrudes, the neck held fast in the urn’s mouth. The heads are those,
from left to
right as seen from auditorium, of W 2, M and W 1. They face undeviatingly front
throughout
the play. Faces so lost to age and aspect as to seem almost part of the urns. (355)
39 The subjects in Play are trapped bodily and also in a stream of memory, wherefrom they
issue a constant verbal regurgitation of moments from their past selves. While they are
animate, they seem to have passed from the realm of the living. The method by which
they  are  interred  casts  a  hellish  pallor  that  announces  the  insignificance  of  their
bodies. The trio is encased, save from the neck up, within urns that trap them in a
punitive stasis from which “They face undeviatingly front throughout the play. Faces so lost
to age and aspect as to seem almost part of urns” (354). The psychological entanglement
between the three stems from a love-triangle-fueled-suicide that culminates in their
purgatorial  present.  The  partitioning  of  the  subjects  in  Play punctuates  their
imprisoned  status.  Not  unlike  prisoners,  the  trio  presents  a  collective—sharing  a
sentence, surveilled by the light to which they must respond and self-surveilling—Are
you listening to me? Is anyone listening to me? Is anyone looking at me? Is anyone
bothering  about  me at  all?  (362)—in what  might  best  be  described  as  a  communal
cognitive fracture. Disembodied by virtue of their imprisonment within the urns, the
figures present mere fragments of physicality. Their disjunctive narrations underscore
their physical segregation. Like prisoners, the trio are separated, yet confined only a
short distance from one another. Unlike Winnie and Willie, however, Beckett does not
allow  for  the  three  to  interact  with  one  another.  Although  they  are  constantly
speaking, there is no discourse between them, and whether or not the trio is at all
aware of one another remains unknowable throughout Play. In Madness and Civilization:
A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, Foucault reasons that:
The substitution of a theme of madness for that of death does not mark a break, but
rather a torsion within the same anxiety. What is in question is still the nothingness
of existence, but this nothingness is no longer considered an external, final term,
both threat and conclusion; it is experienced from within as the continuous and
constant form of existence. (16)
40 Here,  Foucault’s  comparison between madness  and death  provides  an  avenue  from
which to explore the confinement of Beckett’s subjects in Play. Clearly, the trio in Play
no longer has the option of experiencing external relationships or livelihoods. They are
caught  within  a  system  which  prevents  them  from  any  external  pursuit.  The
“nothingness of existence” that the trio endure is, in every respect, “experienced from
within”as  their  respective  woes  can  only  be  experience  internally.  All  of  their
experiences must now take place “from within” the confines of their urns, and their
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imprisonment ensures that their respective anxieties form a “continuous and constant
form of  existence.”  Like  a  child  placed on temporary restriction,  (M)  considers  his
external life—the “that” he refers to his life as having been—and wonders at the
“this” (the present moment) within which he is trapped: “I know now, all that was just…
play. And all this? When will all this—[.…] All this, when will all this have been…just
play?” (361). (M)’s questioning suggests some awareness on his part that that led to this.
However, (M) minimizes any culpability for his part in that—that which led to suicide
and led to this—maintaining that “ was just…play“.
41 In The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, An Introduction, Michel Foucault discusses what he
refers to as “the policing of statements” (qtd. in Norton 1648). Foucault ruminates on
how the  policing  of  statements  regarding  sexuality  or  sexual  practices  leads  to  an
“incitement to discourse” meant to counterbalance the increase in sexual discourse
(1648-49).  Foucault  deals  specifically  with  discourses  spawned  from  instances  of
infraction—breaches  that  instigated  discourses of  confession,  discourses which
required  restrained language:  “But  while  the  language  may have  been refined,  the
scope  of  the  confession—the  confession  of  the  flesh—continually  increased” (1649).
While the discourse of confession leads to self-reflection, for the system of confession
to yield the fruit of its intended purpose, it should inspire penance:
[I]t attributed more and more importance in penance […] to all the insinuations of
the flesh:
thoughts, desires, voluptuous imaginings, delectations, combined movements of the
body and
the soul […] everything had to be told. (1649)
42 Not unlike prisoners, within Play’s trio none take responsibility for how they conducted
themselves prior to their confinement, but they readily recount one another’s faults.
They readily confess,  to borrow Foucault’s  terms,  “all  the insinuations of  the flesh:
thoughts,  desires,  voluptuous  imaginings”  and “delectations”  of  their  love  triangle.
However, where Foucault points to penance as the counterpoint to confession, Beckett
diverges: the subjects in Play confess, but they do not repent, nor do they atone for
their sexual infractions. By separating the trio into urns, alienating their discourses
and sundering them from their external lives or the “that” that led to “this”, Beckett
partitions the love triangle three ways: they are physically trapped, cannot interact,
and  have  no  existence  beyond  their  constraints.  While  they  appear  somewhat
conscious, somewhat aware of their constrained stasis, Beckett excises them and their
respective narrations from any hint of conscience. Like prisoners refusing to confess,
the  three  remain  in  the  purgation  of  their  binds,  unrepentant  despite  their
interrogation.
43 The carceral imagery and surveilling constructs that are woven within Beckett’s works
offer  counterpoints  of  intersection  when  considered  alongside  both  Sartre’s  and
Foucault’s  theories  of  subjectivity.  Indeed,  Sartrean  and  Foucauldian  themes  are
inextricably bound together in some of Beckett’s major works. Within Beckett we see
the objectifying Sartrean gaze appropriated and transformed. Beckett’s theater both
utilizes and diverges from Sartre’s centralized subject/object configurations which see
no  possibility  of  the  subject  escaping  the  formalizing,  objectifying  gaze.  Sartre
emphasizes exteriority of the subject, requiring the gaze to be reflected back between
subjects.  In contrast,  in Beckett’s theater seeing does not guarantee being seen,  as is
exemplified  in  Happy  Days  wherein  Winnie  hails  the  “holy”  light  she  assumes  is
watching her even though she has no evidence that it does. Similarly, in Play the three
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urn-interred subjects wonder at the spot that blinks on and off like an eye observing
them, asking “Am I as much… as being seen?” (366). The scrutinizing light which exists
in both Happy Days and Play is an intensification of the Sartrean gaze, and, certainly, in
Play  the  interrogative  quality  of  the  light  presents  an  enacted  version  of  the  all
powerful gaze.
44 Beckett frames the dissolution of the subject as the construct that ultimately frees his
characters from subjectivity. Understanding the carceral, restrictive, and debilitating
formations vital to the structure of Beckett’s plays is enhanced by careful application of
Foucault’s  concepts  of  carcerality  and panoptic  surveillance.  However,  in  exploring
Beckett’s use of surveillance, we must also question at what point the discomfort of
being objectified by the Other becomes the spur of subjectivity in the Panoptic system.
Beckett’s appropriation of both the Panoptic model and the Sartrean gaze might most
fittingly be described as a willful embrace of the precondition of Sartrean subjectivity.
Beckett  never  totally  abandons  Sartrean  concepts;  however,  as  he  takes  on  the
discomfort and paralysis of the Sartrean model of dueling gazes, he also moves more
toward the kinds of surveilling constructs that would later prove central to Foucault’s
Panoptic  model.  In  this  way,  Beckett’s  use  of  surveillance  and  carceral  formations
anticipates the works of Michel Foucault. Like Sartre and Foucault, Beckett constructs
for our careful  deliberation a mirror of  the prisons in which we daily position and
reposition ourselves.
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NOTES
1. 1 Refers to Sartre’s No Exit,  wherein Garcin recognizes that he has been eternally
condemned  to  endure  the  scrutinizing,  unblinking  gazes  of  Estelle  and  Inez,
proclaiming, “Hell is--other people!” (Sartre 61).
2. In “Tyranny and Theatricality: The Example of Samuel Beckett,” H. Porter Abbott
articulates the actor’s plight in undertaking one of Beckett’s roles: “Beckett is famous
for his exactitude, for the precise realization of his will on stage. One should keep in
mind, moreover, what Beckett does to his actors. He ties ropes around their necks and
crams them in urns. He ties them to rockers. He buries them in sand under hot blinding
lights and gives them impossible scripts to read at breakneck speed[....]” (Abbott, 82).
3. The third book of Milton’s Paradise Lost opens with: “HAIL, holy Light, offspring of
Heaven first-born!/Or of the Eternal coeternal beam/May I  express thee unblamed?
since God is light,...” (John Milton, Complete Poems, The Harvard Classics, 1909–14).
ABSTRACTS
Beckett’s utilization of subjectivity is directly linked to his excavation of the carceral, restrictive,
and debilitating formations which are vital to the structure of his plays. His preoccupation with
confined bodies is expressed across multiple dramatic texts and the characters of Endgame, Happy
Days, and Play are forced to endure such strictures to varying degrees. The carcerality imposed by
or  upon  the  characters  in  these  plays  is  central  to  Beckett’s  development  of  the  dramatic
trajectory of repetition, confinement, constraint, and immobility and, I argue, this demonstrates
how Beckett’s drama utilizes subjectivity in a way that both engages and resists Sartrean themes.
Beckett’s partitioning of the subject and the dispersal of the self bears striking resemblances to
Michel Foucault’s work. This article parses panoptic constructions with Beckett’s portrayals of
subjectivity,  fragmentation,  and  debilitated  physicality  to  establish  how  his  treatment  of
subjectivity anticipates Foucault’s explorations of carcerality.
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L'utilisation de la subjectivité par Beckett est directement liée à son archéologie des formations
carcérales,  restrictives  et  débilitantes  qui  sont  essentielles  à  la  structure  de  ses  pièces.
L'obsession beckettienne des corps confinés est exprimée dans de nombreux textes dramatiques
tels que Endgame, Jours Heureux, et Jouer, dont les personnages sont contraints de supporter ces
restrictions à des degrés divers. La carcéralité imposée par ou sur les personnages de ces pièces
est cruciale dans le développement de la trajectoire dramatique de répétition, de confinement, de
contrainte,  et  d'immobilité.  Cet  article  s’attachera donc à  démontrer  comment le  théâtre  de
Beckett  utilise  la  subjectivité  de  façon  à  ce  qu’une  fois  confrontée  à  la  carcéralité  les  deux
concepts dialoguent et résistent à leur interprétation sartrienne. En outre, la division du sujet et
la  dispersion  de  l’être  chez  Beckett  présentent  des  similitudes  avec  les  travaux  de  Michel
Foucault.  Cet article se donne pour but d’analyser les constructions panoptiques que sont les
portraits  beckettiens  d’une  subjectivité  fragmentée  et  d’une  faiblesse  physique,  et  d’établir
comment un tel traitement du sujet anticipe les explorations foucaldiennes de la carcéralité.
INDEX
Keywords: Beckettian, carceral, consciousness, critical theory, drama, imprisonment,
confinement, restriction, subjectivity, immobility, incapacity, panopticon, postmodern,
partitioning, poststructuralism, theatre
Mots-clés: beckettien, carcéral, consciousness, théorie critique, drame, emprisonnement,
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